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RECENT DECISIONS
CONFLICT OF L A W S -Grouping of Contacts-When the
original negligence occurs within its jurisdiction, the law of the
forum may be applied though the injury occurs in a foreign
state. Myers v. Gaither (D.C. Ct. App. 1967).
Appellant, a resident of Maryland, was driving on a Mary-
land highway when his car was struck in the rear by appellee's
speeding automobile. Appellee, a resident of the District of
Columbia, testified that he was not driving his car when the
accident occurred and that he had not removed the keys from
the car after parking it in the District of Columbia earlier that
evening. The keys were found in the car's ignition at the scene
of the accident, and it was presumed that the car had been stolen."
Failure to remove the ignition key from an unattended car was
prima facie negligence in the District of Columbia and Maryland,
but if Maryland law applied, appellee would not have been
liable because the intervening theft had broken the chain of
causation. If District of Columbia law was applicable, appellee
would have been liable for damages because in that jurisdiction
the theft would not be considered a break in the chain of caus-
ation. The trial judge directed a verdict in favor of appellee. The
District of Columbia Court of Appeals, held, reversed with dir-
ections to grant a new trial. The District of Columbia had con-
tacts with the issue which were superior to those of any other
jurisdiction; therefore, the law of the District controlled. Myers
v. Gaither, 232 A.2d 577 (D.C. Ct. App. 1967).
A conflict between the substantive law of the forum and that
of the foreign state in which the injury occurred was tradition-
ally resolved by the application of the law of the place of
injury. The theoretical rationale for application of this rule of
lex loci delicti has varied,2 but its practical advantages have
been consistently recognized. Lex loci delicti is a clearly defined
standard which facilitates simple, consistent, predictable resolu-
tion of most tort conflict problems. Until recently uniformity of
1. The question whether the car was in fact stolen was not decided by the
jury because the trial court directed the verdict for appellee. The appellate
court as a result considered two alternative possible fact situations. Only one
of the possible fact situations considered is relevant to this discussion, i.e., that
the car was stolen.
2. Compare Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120 (1903) with Loucks
v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918).
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result was the primary consideration in this area of conflict
law,3 but for a generation authorities have criticized the in-
flexible lex loci rule and advocated a more equitable approach to
the choice-of-law problems.4 Not only does the lex loci rule pro-
duce inequitable results by ignoring the policy considerations
which lie beneath the conflicting laws, but it impedes the de-
velopment of better methods for resolving such problems by
providing a mechanical rule which may be thoughtlessly applied.
Various alternatives to dogmatic application of the law of
the place of the tort have been proposed.5 The "grouping of
contacts," "center of gravity," or "significant contacts" approach
has been the most extensively considered alternative and has
been accepted in several jurisdictions.6 With the decision of
Babcock v. JacksoiJ New York specifically rejected the lex
loci delicti and adopted the grouping of contacts approach.
The case was heralded as a milestone in the development of a
new approach to choice-of-law problems involving conflict of
tort laws.8 The New York court described grouping of contacts
as a process for selecting the applicable law by placing emphasis
"upon the law of the place 'which has the most significant con-
tacts with the matter in dispute.'9 Under the new rule the
questions became: What are the contacts, and which contacts
are significant rather than "merely fortuitous"?
The Babcock case dealt with a conflict between the laws
of Ontario and New York with respect to the right of a
guest in an automobile to recover against his host in the event
of tortious operation of the automobile by the host. Ontario
3. See Myers v. Gaither, 232 A.2d 577, 585-86 (D.C. Ct App. 1967) (dis-
sent) ; Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE
L.J. 457, 488 (1924) ; Neuhaus, Legal Certainty Versus Equity in the Conflict
of Laws, 28 LAW & CONTEMPT. PROB. 795, 797 (1963).
4. See Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 478 n.4, 191 N.E.2d 279, 281 n.4,
240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 746-47 n.4 (1963).
5. Note, The Grouping of Contacts-An Innovation in the Conflict of Laws,
18 S.C.L. REv. 453, 456 n.13 (1966).
6. See, e.g., Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240
N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963); Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172
N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961); Griffith v. United Airlines, Inc., 416
Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964). See also RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 379 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1964).
7. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
8. See Cavers, Cheathamn, Currie, Ehrenzweig, Leflar and Reese, Comments
on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development it Conflict of Laws, 63 CoLum.
L. RFv. 1212 (1963).
9. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 479, 191 N.E.2d 279, 282, 240
N.Y.S2d 743, 747 (1963).
1968]
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would not have allowed the guest to recover because in that juris-
diction it was considered to be in the public interest to protect in-
surance companies from suits in which collusion between the
insured party and the injured party was likely. New York law
would permit the guest to sue since it recognizes no appreciable
danger of a large number of collusive actions which would raise
the insurance rates. Ontario's contact with the issue was situs of
the injury. The New York contacts were that the guest and
the host were residents of New York; the car was licensed,
registered, and garaged in New York; the journey began and
was intended to end in New York. In determining that its
contacts with the issue were more significant, the court ex-
amined the policy basis for the Ontario law and concluded that
Ontario's policy was not related to the issue presented. Ontario's
interest lay in preventing collusive suits which would affect the
general auto liability insurance rates in Ontario. A suit by
a New York resident against a New York resident insured in
New York could not affect the Ontario insurance rates, and
therefore the Ontario contact was irrelevant.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals in Myers v.
Gaither abandoned the doctrine of lex loci delicti to which it
had previously adhered'0 and adopted the grouping of con-
tacts approach as implemented in Babcock. The court, in re-
viewing District of Columbia contacts, stated:
The only contacts this case discloses which are purely Mary-
land are the domicile of the appellant and the location of
the accident . . . contacts which are merely "fortuitous";
while the District's contacts are domicile of the appellee,
the situs of the original or primary negligence, the chosen
forum, and the overriding public interest in proscribing
the conduct here alleged."
In coming to the conclusion that the Maryland contacts were
merely fortuitous, the court cited the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws 1 2 and Vanston Bondholders Protective Com-
mittee v. Green 3 in support of the proposition that the purposes
10. See, e.g., Miller & Long Co. v. Shaw, 204 A2d 697 (D.C. Ct. App. 1964);
Knight v. Handley Motor Co., 198 A2d 747 (D.C. Ct. App. 1964).
11. Myers v. Gaither, 232 A.2d 577, 584 (D.C. Ct. App. 1967).
12. RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF CoNmicr OF LAWS § 379 (Tent Draft No. 9,
1964).
13. 329 U.S. 156 (1946).
[Vol. 20
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behind the tort rules should be considered in determining the
relevance of contacts.
The District's rule, that the appellee should be liable for the
acts of the thief by virtue of the fact that he negligently facili-
tated the theft by leaving the keys in his car,14 was intended to
discourage car theft in the District. By discouraging this prac-
tice the public would be protected from the high speed chases
incident to automobile theft.15 The District's interest in en-
couraging removal of keys from cars left unattended in the
District was furthered by holding appellee liable for the acci-
dent. Maryland's rule which would not allow recovery in the
same situation indicated that Maryland was not so concerned
with car thefts as the District. Therefore, the car owner was
protected when there was an intervening theft. Since the act
occurred in the District of Columbia, its policy would have
been thwarted if its law were not applied. However, the Mary-
land policy was not hindered by failure to apply Maryland's
law because the owner who was held liable was not a resident
of Maryland. This left Maryland with no interest in protecting
him from the consequences of his act committed in the District
of Columbia.
This was not the first consideration of the grouping of con-
tacts by a District of Columbia court.' Williams v. Rawlings
Truck Line, Incorporated17 presented a problem theoretically
though not factually analagous to Myers and Babcock. The court
resolved the conflict without resort to grouping of contacts, even
though the existence of the new rule was noted.' 8 The case was
held to present "a classic false conflicts situation" because appli-
cation of the foreign law would not interfere with any District
of Columbia policy, but failure to apply the foreign law would
frustrate the policy of the foreign state. The court applied a
New York regulation to determine an issue raised by an acci-
dent which happened in the District of Columbia.
14. Ross v. Hartman, 139 F2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S.
790 (1944).
15. Id.
16. See Tramontana v. Varig Airlines, 383 U.S. 943 (1966); Roscoe v.
Roscoe, 379 F.2d 94 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Williams v. Rawlings Truck Line, Inc.,
357 F.2d 581 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
17. 357 F.2d 581 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
18. Id. at 586.
1968]
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It seems that in the face of the Myers dissent, which extolled
the practical virtue of lex loci delicti,19 it would have been more
judicious to employ the Wilama rather than the Babcock
method, since the immediate results would have been the same
in either case. In the final analysis both seem to be based on
an inspection of the policies behind the tort laws and the
relation of the policies to the issue presented.
If the court had followed Williams, however, it would only
have created another exception to the lex loci rule. In adopting
the grouping of contacts approach the court has weakened the
basic lex loci concept. Also, it has diminished the likelihood that
subsequent courts will automatically apply the lex loci rule
in the District of Columbia. Choice of law based on the policies
underlying the tort laws which conflict is much more likely
because the court chose the grouping of contacts approach.
The South Caroline Supreme Court has declined to abandon
the established lex loci delicti rule,20 at least until a better rule
has been developed and established. Myers does not change the
process established in Babcock in any way which would make
it more acceptable to South Carolina, but it does put the
weight of another jurisdiction behind the grouping of con-
tacts approach and supplies another crucible for its case by
case development.
CHAls F. AILSTOoK
19. Myers v. Gaither, 232 A.2d 577, 585-86 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
20. Osheik v. Osheik, 244 S.C. 249, 255, 136 S.E.2d 303, 306 (1964).
[Vol. 2.0
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-Prohibition Against the Imposition
of a Harsher Sentence on Retrail-A greater sentence cannot be
imposed after a new trial is granted because of a constitutional
error in the original trial. Patton v. North Carolina (4th Cir.
1967).
The defendant pleaded nolo contendere in October, 1960, to a
charge of armed robbery and was sentenced to twenty years in
prison. In April, 1964, the defendant moved for a post-convic-
tion hearing on the basis of Gideon v. Wainwright'1 and was
awarded a new trial. With assistance of counsel the defendant
pleaded not guilty at the subsequent trial, but was convicted
under the original indictment and sentenced to twenty years
in prison on February 17, 1967.
Having been incarcerated since June 10, 1960, the defendant
applied to the district court for a writ of habeas corpus, con-
tending that the subsequent twenty year sentence in addition
to the previous period of confinement, constituted a harsher
sentence than that imposed at the original trial. He further con-
tended that the subsequent sentence should be vacated. His
argument was that a harsher sentence following a second con-
viction for the same offense represented a denial of due process,
was inconsistent with the prohibition against double jeopardy,
and was a denial of equal protection of the law. The district
court reversed, ruling that the harsher sentence violated due
process and equal protection standards. The Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals, held, affirmed. The harsher sentence upon
retrial violated the constitutional guarantees of due process,
equal protection, and the prohibition against double jeopardy.
Patton v. North Carolina, 381 F.2d 636 (4th Cir. 1967).
Courts have generally upheld the imposition of a greater
sentence upon an individual when he has been granted a new
trial. In sustaining heavier sentences, the courts have relied on
three theories to counter constitutional objections: First, the
petitioner was deemed to have "waived" the right to rely on the
findings and adjudications of the original trial;2 Second, the
original trial was to be considered as "void"-having never ex-
1. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
2. See, e.g., Brewster v. Swope, 180 F.2d 984 (9th Cir. 1950) ; Robinson v.




South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [], Art. 7
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol20/iss1/7
Sou CAROLIIA LAW RiEsmw
isted ;3 Third, the petitioner had subjected himself to "continuing
jeopardy."14 The Patton decision rejected these arguments.
Under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment,
the basic argument of the court can be stated as follows: "The
subjection of the defendant to the risk of a harsher penalty upon
retrial and conviction for the same offense, as a condition of re-
ceiving a fundamentally fair trial, is an unconstitutional con-
dition on his right to a fair trial."5
Previously, the due process argument had been rejected if the
new sentence together with the original confinement did not
exceed the specified statutory maximum for the committed
offense.6 The Patton decision vitiated this reasoning by stating
that "[ilt is grossly unfair for society to take five years of a
man's life and then say, we now acknowledge that this should not
have happened, but we will set everything right by refusing to
recognize that it did happen."
7
This "fundamental fairness" argument has been used ex-
tensively in incorporating particular sections of the Bill of
Rights into the fourteenth amendment and applying these
sections to state criminal proceedings.8 In Patton the court
used this "fundamental fairness" test in concluding that a harsh-
er sentence upon retrial violated due process of law.
Patton determined that it was a violation of due process to
grant an indivdual a constitutional right to a new trial and
3. E.g., Hobbs v. Maryland, 231 Md. 533, 191 A2d 238 (1963), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 914 (1963).
4, Kohlfuss v. Warden, Conn. State Prison, 149 Conn. 692, 183 A.2d 626
(1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 928 (1962) ; Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S.
100 (1904) (Holmes, J., in his dissent stated that a second trial based on the
original case is only a continuation of that case).
5. Van Alstyne, Ip Gideon's Wake: Harsh Penalties and the Successful
Criminal Appellant, 74 YALa L.J. 606, 613 (1965) ; see Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S.
391 (1963) ; Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
6. E.g., Hobbs v. Maryland, 231 Md. 533, 191 A.2d 238 (1963), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 914 (1963).
7. Patton v. North Carolina, 381 F.2d 636, 639 (4th Cir. 1967) (emphasis
added) ; see, United States v. Walker, 346 F.2d 428 (4th Cir. 1965).
8. See, e.g., Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (incorporation
of sixth amendment's right to speedy trial) ; Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1
(1964) (incorporation of fifth amendment's prohibition against self-incrimina-
tion); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (incorporation of fourth amend-
ment); Contra, Palko v. Connecticut, 320 U.S. 319 (1937) (double jeopardy
clause of sixth amendment was not incorporated into the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment).
[Vol. 20
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then restrict his enjoyment of this right by threatening him
with a harsher sentence should he be reconvicted.
The court next turned its attention to the fourteenth amend-
ment and considered the defendant's equal protection argument.
This was perhaps the weakest argument presented for reversal.
The Patton decision articulated the proposition that the North
Carolina procedure permitting courts to review a sentence on
successful appeal, is arbitarily discriminatory and must fail
upon the application of the equal protection clause. The court
based its conclusion on the rationale that if all convicted per-
sons are considered as a class, then those who choose to exercise
the right of appeal are subjected to the possibility of receiving
a greater sentence. Those who choose to remain in prison are
not subjected to an increase in sentence. The court derived its
equal protection argument from a comparison of these two
classes of convicted persons stating that:
North Carolina strictly forbids an increase in a defend-
ant's sentence after the trial court's term has expired and
service of sentence has commenced. Thus the threat of a
heavier sentence falls solely on those who utilize the post-
conviction procedures provided by the state. . . . This is
an arbitrary classification offensive to the equal protection
clause.9
The traditional equal protection standard was discussed in
Griffin v. Illinois." The GCiffin Court held that a defendant
was denied equal protection when he was refused a trial trans-
script on appeal because of his indigency. The decision stated
that a class was established among those defendants who exer-
cised an appeal. This class could be further divided into two
subclasses. One of the subclasses was composed of those denied
trial transcripts on appeal because of their inability to pur-
chase them. The other subclass consisted of those able to purchase
transcripts. Consequently, those who could afford a transcript
maintained an advantage in their appeals, and therein lay the
equal protection violation.
In Patton, no such classification can be made within that
class which seeks to appeal. All are subject to a potentially
heavier sentence and all stand on equal footing in their separate
appeals.
9. Patton v. North Carolina, 381 F.2d 636, 642 (4th Cir. 1967).
10. 351 U.S. 12 (1956) ; accord, Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
1968]
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In essence, the Griffin decision pointed out arbitrary class
discrimination within a class. These elements usually make up
the standard on which a violation of equal protection is based,1
but in comparing Patton with Griffin, no arbitrary discrimi-
nation is found within the class of appellants in the Patton
situation.
The court next considered the double jeopardy contention;
however, it was not clear from the opinion to what extent the
court rested its decision on this consideration.
12
The constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy has
been traditionally invoked to prohibit "multiple prosecutions"
in federal procedures.'" However, the double jeopardy clause
has yet to be incorporated into the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. 14 Therefore, the constitutional guarantee
against double jeopardy does not preclude an appeal by the
states when the appeal is based on prejudicial error in the
original trial or when a defendant appeals a state conviction
and is granted a new trial.'-
Some inroads have been made into the proposition that states
are free to reprosecute without violating double jeopardy. Bart-
leus v. Illinois I' acknowledged some double jeopardy content in
the fourteenth amendment, although the court did not specific-
ally indicate where the line should be drawn.
The Patton decision was not concerned with multiple prose-
cutions, but it enforced the double jeopardy clause against the
11. See genera!Iy Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) ; Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186 (1962) ; Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
12. 381 F.2d 636 (4th Cir. 1967). The court initiates its argument on double
jeopardy by saying that "[i]n view of the foregoing [equal protection and due
process], we need not rest our decision on double jeopardy grounds." Id. at 643.
But at the end of the opinion, the court says: "To summarize, we conclude that
increasing Patton's punishment ...placed him twice in jeopardy of punish-
ment for the same offense." Id. at 646.
13. Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963); United States v. Ball,
163 U.S. 662 (1896).
14. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). This decision established
the prccedent that the fifth amendment's prohibition against placing an accused
in double jeopardy would not be applicable to state court prosecutions under the
fourteenth amendment's due process clause. See, e.g., Cichos v. Indiana, 385
U.S. 76 (1966). In this case the Court decided that the defendant's contention
that he had been placed in double jeopardy was invalid. The Court stated that
it was unnecessary to consider whether the double jeopardy prohibition would
be applied to the states by the fourteenth amendment.
15. Louisiana ex rcl. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
16. 359 U.S. 121 (1959) ; see United States ex rel. Hetenyi v. Wilkins, 34
F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1965) ; "[ait least the basic core of that double jeopardy gua-
rantee can be ranked as fundamental." Id. at 853.
[Vol. 2.0
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states when a harsher sentence was imposed at a new trial
granted in reliance upon a constitutional post-conviction remedy.
The court premised its argument on a restriction against "multi-
ple punishment." It decided that since double jeopardy precluded
an increased sentence once the defendant had begun serving his
time,17 the defendant could not be sentenced to a longer term at
his new trial, unless he had waived his rights of protection
against multiple punishment. Since involuntary waiver offends
due process, it cannot be said that he had waived this guarantee;
therefore, the protection against multiple punishment continued
through sentencing in the subsequent trial.'8 The court also
based its conclusion in part on Green v. United States'0 in which
it was held that a defendant may not be subjected to a more
stringent penalty in a new trial when he had been previously
convicted of the same offense and had been given a milder sen-
tence. The Green decision was based on the theory of "implied
acquittal." The Court determined that once the defendant had
been convicted of second degree murder, he was impliedly ac-
quitted of first degree murder in his new trial.
At least one state court has reached the same conclusion as the
Patton court. In People v. Henderso7O0 the Supreme Court of
California held that to impose a heavier sentence at a new trial
violates the due process and the double jeopardy clauses of
California's Constitution.
More importantly, a conflict has arisen among circuit courts.
A First Circuit case, Marano v. United States21 reached the
same result as the Patton decision, but in Starner v. Russell,22
the Third Circuit reached the opposite result.
This conflict of the circuits will hopefully bring this question
before the Supreme Court for final adjudication. Since the
basic argument seems to involve the protection of an individual's
constitutional right to a fair trial when a new trial is granted,
and in view of the Supreme Court's recent decisions protecting
the criminally accused, it appears that the Patton decision con-
forms with today's trends.
MICITART W. SMITH
17. See, e.g., United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304 (1931) ; United States v.
Sacco, 367 F2d 368 (2d Cir. 1966).
18. Walsh v. United States, 374 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1967); Whaley v. North
Carolina, 379 F2d 221 (4th Cir. 1967); United States v. Walker, 346 F.2d
428 (4th Cir. 1965).
19. 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
20. 60 Cal. 2d 482, 386 P.2d 677, 35 Cal. Rptr. 71 (1963).
21. 374 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1967).
22. 378 F.2d 808 (3d Cir. 1967).
1968]
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-Sixth Amendment Right to Com-
pulsory Process-The right of a defendant to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor is a fundamental
right applicable to the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment. Washingtonv . Texas (Sup. Ct. 1967).
Petitioner was convicted of murder with malice and sen-
tenced to fifty years in prison. Testifying on his own behalf,
petitioner claimed that his coparticipant fired the fatal shotgun
blast and offered the testimony of his coparticipant to substanti-
ate this version of the facts.' On the basis of two Texas statutes
providing that persons charged or convicted as coparticipants in
the same crime as either principals, accomplices or accessories
could not testify for one another,2 the trial judge refused to
allow the coparticipant to testify and petitioner was convicted.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals refused to sustain appel-
lant's objection that he had been denied his constitutional right
of compulsory process, and held that the legislature has the
power, except as limited by the state constitution, to prescribe
the competency of witnesses in all cases." On appeal to the United
States Supreme Court, held, reversed. The right of an accused to
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
guaranteed in federal trials by the sixth amendment, was so
1. Fuller v. State, 397 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966).
2. "Persons charged as principals, accomplices or accessories, whether in the
same or by different indictments, cannot be introduced as witnesses for one
another, but they may claim a severance, and if one or more be acquitted they
may testify in behalf of the others." TEx. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 82 (1925) (re-
pealed 1967).
Persons charged as principals, accomplices or accessories, whether in
the same or different indictments cannot be introduced as witnesses for
one another, but they may claim a severance; and, if one or more be
acquitted, or the prosecution against them be dismissed, they may testify
in behalf of the others.
TEx. CODE CRIb. PRoc. ANN. art. 711 (1925).
Art. 711 was apparently repealed by implication by art. 36.09 of the TEx CODE
CRIMr. PROc. ANN. (1965) which became effective after petitioner's trial. Art.
36.09 provides that:
Two or more defendants who are jointly and separately indicted or com-
plained against for the same offense or an offense growing out of the
same transaction may be, in the discretion of the court, tried jointly or
separately as to one or more defendants; provided that in any event either
defendant may testify for the other or on behalf of the State....
However, Brown v. State, 401 S.W.2d 251 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966) held, citing
Washington v. State, 400 S.W.2d 756 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966) as authority,
that the statutory provisions providing that parties charged as principals cannot
be introduced as witnesses for one another were valid and not impliedly re-
pealed.
3. Washington v. State, 400 S.W.2d 756 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966).
['Vol. 20
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fundamental and essential to a fair trial that it was incorporated
in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Wash-
ington v. Texas, 87 S.Ct. 1920 (1967).
At common law an accused did not have the right to com-
pulsory process of obtaining witnesses in his favor. The history
of the law securing for accused persons the right to compulsory
process for their witnesses shows that the purpose of statutes
was merely to cure the defect of the common law by giving
to defendants in criminal cases the common right which was
already possessed both by parties in civil cases and by the prose-
cution in criminal cases. 4 Jealously guarding their right to
maintain wide latitude in criminal procedure," the majority of
states enacted constitutional provisions which agreed with the
compulsory process guarantee of the sixth amendment,6 and
gradually relaxed limitations on an accused's right to secure
witnesses in his favor.7 Most state constitutions provided nothing
new or exceptional, but gave solid sanction in the special case
of accused persons to the procedure recognized and practiced
for witnesses in general. However, some states retained certain
qualifications as to the right of an accused to secure compulsory
process.
8
The federal courts refused to abandon the harsh common law
restrictions, despite Court cognizance in United States v. ReidO
that the sixth amendment was predicated on the desire to
remove the harsh and odious rules that prevented a defendant
fTrom securing witnesses in his defense in a criminal proceeding.
The Court, however, expressly overruled Reid in Rosen v. United
States,10 but rested its decision on nonconstitutional grounds.11
4. 8 J. WiGmoPE, EVIDENCE § 2191 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
5. See Cicenia v. LaGay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958); Hoag v. New Jersey, 356
U.S. 464 (1958) ; United States ex rel. Thompson v. Price, 258 F.2d 918 (3d
Cir. 1958).
6. E.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-506 (1962), which implements S.C. CONST.
art. I, § 18 (1895).
7. See, e.g., State ex rel. Gladden v. Lonergan, 201 Ore. 163, 269 P.2d 491
(1954) ; State v. Kennedy, 85 S.C. 146, 67 S.E. 152 (1910) ; McCaleb v. State,
401 S.W.2d 611 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966). But see State v. Pope, 78 S.C. 264,
58 S.E. 815 (1907).
8. See 8 J. WIGORE, EVIDENCE § 2191 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
9. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 361 (1852).
10. 245 U.S. 467 (1918).
11. Id. The Court concluded that the "dead hand of the common law rule" of
the Judiciary Act of 1789, by which the competency of witnesses in criminal
trials in United States' courts was determined by the rules of evidence which
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In United States v. Seeger12 the district court stated that under
the sixth amendment a defendant in a federal trial has the
right to compel attendance of witnesses, and may not be de-
prived of that right when it is believed that the witnesses may
offer proof to negate the Government's evidence or support the
defense. The court asserted that denial of the right as secured
by the sixth amendment would also be a denial of the right
to fair trial under the due process clause of the fifth amendment.
The right to secure compulsory process deemed so funda-
mental and essential to a fair trial by federal standards, certainly
should be afforded in a state proceeding to protect an accused
from state abridgment of those rights recognized as funda-
mental elements of due process under the fourteenth amend-
ment. In Pointer v. Texas'3 the Court stated that the guarantee
of the right of an accused to be confronted with witnesses is
to be enforced against the states under the fourteenth amend-
ment according to the same standards that protect those per-
sonal rights against federal encroachment. The Court, in Gideon
v. Wainwright,'4 which made the right to counsel obligatory
upon the states through the application of the fourteenth
amendment, stated that "those guarantees of the Bill of Rights
which are fundamental safeguards of liberty immune from
federal abridgment are equally protected against state invasion
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."'15
In deciding whether compulsory process is a fundamental
right as secured by the sixth amendment guarantee, it is less
than surprising that the Court adhered to those mandates which
accorded an accused the right to have assistance of counsel for
his defense, to be confronted with witnesses against himself, and
to have the right to a speedy' 6 and public trial.17 The opportun-
ity to be heard in defense is a right basic to our system of
jurisprudence,' 8 and the rights to offer the testimony of wit-
nesses and to compel their appearance before the court are
essential to the establishment of a defense. These rights, necessi-
tated by the demands of due process, were thus placed on no
12. 180 F. Supp. 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
13. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
14. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
15. Id. at 341.
16. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
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lesser footing than previously accorded sixth amendment guaran-
tees made applicable to the states by the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment.19
It is a principle well established in law that courts have the
power to procure attendance of witnesses, including convicted
felons.20 Upon court determination that attendance of a witness
is necessary in a proper hearing it is within the court's power to
compel attendance of a witness confined in jail or a state
prison.2 1 In Washington the Texas court did not refuse to compel
the coparticipant's attendance, but denied the right of compul-
sory process in favor of the accused because a state statute arbi-
trarily made his testimony inadmissible. The Court stated that
the rule could not be defended on the ground that it sets apart
persons most likely to commit perjury.2 2 The Court established
the right of compulsory process as a fundamental element of due
process protected from arbitrary state abridgment by the four-
teenth amendment.
The Washington decision, while marking total incorporation
of the sixth amendment into the fourteenth amendment, portends
no radical changes in criminal procedure in a majority of the
states. Henceforth, the states may not arbitrarily deny compul-
sory process in a criminal proceeding by fettering an accused
with statutory provisions designed to delimit the effectiveness
of federal and state constitutional provisions.
J mS G. BoYD
19. Washington v. Texas, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 1923 (1967).
20. Compare State v. Bagges, 350 Mo. 984, 169 S.W.2d 407 (1943) and Lee v.
State, 70 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. Crim., App. 1934) with Magee v. State, 187 So. 2d
274 (Ala. 1966) and State ex rel. Gladden v. Lonegran, 201 Ore. 163, 269
P.2d 491 (1954).
21. 97 C.J.S. Witnesses § 14(b) (1957).
22. Washington v. Texas, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 1925 (1967).
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EVIDENCE--Wrongful Death of a Minor-Evidence of a de-
cedent minor's moral delinquencies is inadmissible to mitigate
damages in a suit for loss of society, and for the sorrow, suffer-
ing, and mental anguish of the family. Gamle v. Hill (Va.
1967).
Plaintiff, as administrator, brought an action for wrongful
death of his sixteen year old daughter who was killed in a
collision between an automobile and a bus. The automobile in
which she was a passenger was driven by the decedent Haley,
and the bus was owned by the Virginia Transit Company. In
his suit against both drivers and the bus company, plaintiff
sought damages for loss of society, and for the sorrow, suffer-
ing, and mental anguish of the parents and other members of
the decendent's family. In an attempt to mitigate damages, de-
fendants requested that they be allowed to develop evidence
demonstrating certain of the decedent's moral delinquencies:
namely, that at the age of sixteen she was the mother of a three
year old illegitimate child; and that she was unmarried and
pregnant at the time of her death. The trial court held this
evidence inadmissible, and ultimately a twenty thousand dollar
verdict was returned against all defendants.
The defendants appealed, but only Haley's administratix at-
tacked the lower court's ruling on the inadmissibility of the
evidence. The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, held,
affirmed in part, reversed in part.1 The evidence tendered by
the defendants was not relevant to the issue of damages, and
thus was properly excluded. Gamble v. Hill, 156 S.E.2d 888
(Va. 1967).
The leading authorities recognize that evidence of a person's
character may be relevant and thus admissible in three situa-
tions: First, when character is an issue or operative fact for
determining rights and liabilities; second, when character is
used as an evidentiary fact to prove conduct and state of mind
by circumstantial evidence; third, when character is used to
impeach the credibility of a witness.2 Clearly, the last two
1. On appeal judgment was reversed against the defendant bus driver Gamble
and the Virginia Transit Company for reasons not relevant to the present dis-
cussion. The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia held that the evidence was
insufficient to support finding that the driver of the bus was guilty of any
negligence which was a proximate cause of the collision and the death of the
plaintiff's intestate.
2. 1 J. WIGMoRE, EviDE cE §§ 52-81 (3d ed., 1940); C. McCoRmIcx, Evi-
DENCE §§ 153-62 (3d ed. 1954).
[Vol. 20
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criteria have no application in the present controversy. In regard
to the first situation, Gamble considers whether character evi-
dence is admissible to mitigate damages in a wrongful death
action.
Evidence of a deceased's character is frequently admissible
when direct pecuniary loss to a beneficiary is in issue.3 In
addition, when members of a decedent's family testify as to
his character and relationship with the family, the defendant
on cross examination may demonstrate the decedent's bad habits
and unhappy family relationship.4 Bad character and habits
are recognized as material in estimating the amount that an
individual can anticipate earning during a normal life ex-
pectancy, and thus are relevant to show the extent of a bene-
ficiary's loss of support.5 In Gamble, a case of first impression,
the Virginia court was presented the question of whether to
admit evidence of moral character in a case in which plaintiff
has offered no evidence of decedent's character and seeks to
recover for loss of society, sorrow, suffering and mental anguish
to the family rather than for pecuniary loss.
There is conflict of authority in other jurisdictions as to
whether evidence of moral character of juveniles should be
admitted at trial on the issue of damages. Indeed, cases from
other states "throw little light on just why such evidence should
be admitted or excluded." 6 Of the five cases cited in the Gamble
opinionJ none dealt with the kind of damages sought in the
present action; moreover, four of these five cases concerned at-
tempts to introduce evidence of juvenile misbehavior or penal
commitment. Perhaps these cases should have been limited to
their factual situations.
Both Anthony v. New York Central Railroads and Hill v.
Egie Railroad9 excluded records of juvenile delinquency pro-
3. 1 J. WIGMoR, EvmENCE § 210 a (3d ed. 1940). See, e.g., Wimberly v.
City of Paterson, 75 N.J. Super. 584, 183 A.2d 691, (1962); Hill v. Erie R.R.
225 App. Div. 19, 232 N.Y.S. 66 (1928) ; Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Lumpkins, 151
Va. 173, 144 S.E. 485 (1928); Fleming v. City of Seattle, 45 Wash. 2d 477,
275 P.2d 904 (1954).
4. Basham v. Terry, 199 Va. 817, 102 S.E.2d 285 (1958).
5. 1 J. W Gmoa, EvIDnC § 210 a (3d ed. 1940).
6. Gamble v. Hill, 156 S.E.2d 888, 893 (Va. 1967).
7. Anthony v. New York Central 1hR., 61 Ill. App. 2d 466, 209 N.E2d 686
(1965); Smith v. King, 239 S.W.2d 955 (Ky. 1951); Wimberley v. City of
Paterson, 75 N.J. Super. 584, 183 A.2d 691 (1962) ; Russell v. Cirillo, 17 App.
Div. 2d 1005, 234 N.Y.S.2d 67 (1962); Hill v. Erie R.R., 225 App. Div. 19,
232 N.Y.S. 66 (1928).
8. 61 Ill. App. 2d 466, 209 N.E.2d 686 (1965).
9. 225 App. Div. 19, 232 N.Y.S. 66 (1928).
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ceedings. The exclusion in the former opinion was based on
the grounds that the misbehavior was too remote since it oc-
curred four years prior to death. If this alone were to be the
criterion, the evidence in the present case would certainly not
be too remote in time. In Hill the prior proceeding was found
inadmissible because the adjudications did not have sufficient
probative force to constitute legal evidence. The court stated
that it did not "mean to intimate that it is not open to the
defendant in such a case as this to show the habits and character
of the child.''1° In each of these cases the respective courts
determined that the language of their juvenile statutes intended
to exclude such evidence so as not to penalize a child in any
way.
R'ussell V. Cirillo" in effect reversed Hill by allowing intro-
duction of evidence of two juvenile commitments in an action
for wrongful death since the identical information appeared
on the school records of the deceased. Likewise, the Appellate
Division of the New Jersey Superior Court admitted evidence
demonstrating that the decedent had been commited to a boys'
home because this might reflect on his future earning capacity.12
This decision recognized that particular "bad acts" on the de-
ceased's part could be introduced to aid in determining dam-
ages, although the court furnishes no insight into what these
acts might encompass.
If parents in a wrongful death action seek damages for loss
of society or companionship, such a suit is a variant of the
husband's action for loss of consortium when his wife is injured
or killed. 13 As early as 1890, the Virginia Court in Simmons v.
MoConnell 4 recognized the analogy between these two types of
10. Id. 232 N.Y.S. at 69.
11. 17 App. Div. 2d 1005, 234 N.Y.S.2d 67 (1962).
12. Wimberley v. City of Paterson, 75 N.J. Super. 584, 183 A.2d 691 (1962).
13. Note, Damages for the Death of a Minor Child, 15 DEFENSE L. 3. 278
(1966).
14. 86 Va. 494, 10 S.E. 838, 839 (1890). The court, in recognizing that all
the surrounding circumstances and situations in regard to the family ought to
be considered, stated that:
[T]he "solace and comfort" afforded to his mother, and her "sorrow,
suffering, and mental anguish" occasioned by his death might all properly
be considered . . . in estimating . . . damages.
Then the court continued:
If the character and conduct of the wife be such that her death will cause
but little "sorrow, suffering, and mental anguish" to the husband, then
the fair and just proportion of the damages ought to be awarded.
[Vol. 20
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damages. Gamble, however, makes no reference to loss of con-
sortium.
An early Massachusetts case,15 in an opinion by Justice
Holmes, upheld the admission of evidence of moral character to
mitigate damages in a loss of companionship suit brought for
the wife's injury. The evidence demonstrated that the husband
did not avail himself of the companionship and society of the
wife. More recent decisions have also allowed introduction of
evidence to show the lack of love and affection existing among
the husband, wife and their family.16
The rationale advanced for allowing mitigation of damages
in consortium cases is that a realistic appraisal of damages is
likely to occur. When all evidence is weighed by the jury, hope-
fully only the actual loss will be compensated. 17 Moreover, at
least one jurisdiction has recognized that in suits for wrongful
death of children, the degree of intimacy between the child
and its parents may be considered, so that only actual damages
will be compensated."" At the heart of the present case is the
question of whether this evidence would balance the monetary
scales instead of tipping them prejudicially toward the de-
fendant.
None of the authority above offered a controlling precedent
for the task facing the Virginia court. Consequently, the court
had to rely upon policy considerations rather than judicial
authority. Two reasons were advanced by the majority for ex-
cluding the proffered evidence.
The first reason suggested was that this evidence was not rele-
vant to the element of damages because it did not demon-
strate that the intestate's immoral acts resulted in her parents
and family having less affection for her. Since the parents
allowed their daughter to remain at home, the majority felt
it appropriate to look to the parable of the Prodigal Son to
support the proposition that "despite such moral delinquencies
15. Sullivan v. Lowell & D. St Ry., 162 Mass. 536, 39 N.E. 185 (1895). This
case is discussed in Note, Mitigation of Damages for Loss of Consortium, 28 U.
PiTr. L. Ray. 366, 367 n.7 (1966).
16. E.g., Craig v. Boston & Me. R.R., 92 N.H. 408, 32 A.2d 316 (1943);
Capital Airlines v. Barger, 47 Tenn. App. 636, 341 S.W.2d 579 (1960); Mat-
thews v. Hicks, 197 Va. 112, 87 S.E2d 629 (1955).
17. See Note, Mitigation of Damages for Loss of Consortium, 28 U. Pirr. L.
REv. 366, 369-70 (1966).
18. Anderson v. Great N. Ry., 15 Idaho 513, 99 P. 91 (1908), reaff'd in
Gardner v. Hobbs, 69 Idaho 288, 206 P.2d 539 (1948).
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the parents of a wayward child may have deep affection for
it.,,gA
In a vigorous dissent Justice Carrico emphasized the word
"may" in the language used by the majority. He readily admit-
ted that the parents may love this child as much, but questioned
whether they did in fact have as deep affection for her. The
jury, as the trier of fact, should determine the true relation-
ship between the family and this child. Failure to allow the evi-
dence establishes as a matter of law that a girl of immoral
character affords the same society to her family as does a
child of good character.
The second reason offered by the majority was that the
evidence would be prejudicial, and thus possibly confuse the
jury who might substitute the issue of moral delinquencies of
the child for the true issue of compensation for the parents.
Apparently there was fear that members of the jury might sub-
stitute their own moral standard for that of the parents in
determining the amount of damages.
To counter this, the dissent relied on the prejudicial effect
that resulted from barring the evidence. The plaintiff was
entitled to the presumtion that the child was innocent of any
wrongdoing. Against this presumption, the defense should have
been entitled to introduce character evidence to rebut it. The
prejudicial effect was exemplified when the plaintiff's counsel
in his closing statement referred to this young girl in the follow-
ing terms:
I ... suggest to you respectfully, that [when I think of]
a sixteen year old girl . . . I think of the American ex-
pression 'sweet sixteen.' I am not suggesting, I am just
saying that [this] is an epitome of youth, sweet sixteen.
20
The majority acknowledged that this summation was prejudi-
cial, but not reversible, since no objection was made in the trial.
Under the dissenter's view the original error was in excluding
the character evidence because it permitted the plaintiff's coun-
sel to refer to this child as "sweet sixteen"--indeed, the pre-
sumption was that she was "sweet sixteen."
Although there was no direct proof presented, the jury was
allowed to infer that the death of this young girl may have
19. Gamble v. Hill, 156 S.E2d 888, 894 (Va. 1967) (emphasis added).
20. Id. at 896.
[ ol. 20
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brought sorrow, suffering, and mental anguish, as well as loss
of society to her parents. Family relationship alone was suffi-
cient to permit recovery. The defendant's evidence attempted
to demonstrate that the damages might not have been as great
as presumed. This evidence was relevant for determining the
exact loss to the family.
Gambe may be of significance in our own jurisdiction in that
South Carolina allows substantially the same type of damages
for wrongful death as Virginia2 1 and apparently has never
passed on this precise issue. If the South Carolina courts con-
front this question, they should realize that while such evidence
itself may not show that there is any lack of affection between
the child and her family, to exclude the evidence may well cir-
cumvent the concept of compensating only the plaintiff's actual
loss.
R. DAvws Howsim
21. E.g., Todd v. Sandidge Constr. Co., 341 F2d 75 (4th Cir. 1964) ; John-
son v. Charleston & W. C. Ry., 234 S.C. 448, 108 S.E.2d 777 (1959); Nelson
v. Charleston & W. C. Ry., 231 S.C. 351, 98 S.E.2d 79 (1957); Gomillion v.
Forsythe, 218 S.C. 211, 62 S.E.2d 297 (1950); Mishoe v. Atlantic Coast Line
R.R., 186 S.C. 402, 197 S.E. 97 (1938).
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TORTS- Contributory Negligence- Illinois judicially aban-
doned the doctrine of contributory negligence as contrary to
justice and public policy and adopted the concept of comparative
negligence. Maki v. Frelo (Ill. App. 1967).
Plaintiff's decedent was killed in an automobile collision. As
administratrix of decedent's estate, plaintiff filed a complaint
basing the cause of action on Illinois' Wrongful Death Act.'
The complaint did not allege the ordinary care which was neces-
sary to oversome the defense of contributory negligence. Instead,
the plaintiff alleged that if there were any negligence on her de-
cedent's behalf, it was less than that of the defendant when the
acts of the two parties were compared. Following settled Illinois
law,2 the circuit court upheld defendant's motion to dismiss the
allegation for failure to state a cause of action. Plaintiff appealed
directly to the Illinois Supreme Court on the theory that the
Illinois rule of contributory negligence was an unconstitutional
violation of due process under the United States Constitution
and that of Illinois. The Illinois Supreme Court held that no
constitutional question of a nature necessary to give it jurisdic-
tion on direct appeal was raised. However, on its own motion
the court transferred the case to the appellate court for the
second district to "[consider] the question of whether, as a matter
of justice and public policy, the [contributory negligence] rule
should be changed."3 The appellate court, held, reversed and re-
manded. Present day conditions require, as a matter of justice
and public policy, that the contributory negligence rule be aban-
doned and one of comparative negligence be adopted. Maki V.
Frelk, 85 Ill. App. 2d 439, 229 N.E.2d 284 (1967).
Just as Illinois used public policy to strike down contributory
negligence, it generally has been felt that policy considerations
aimed at controlling tort liability of "emerging" industries
1. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70, § 1 (1959); Id. § 2 (Supp. 1967); see also S.C.
CODE AnN. § lq-1951 (1962).
2. Illinois adopted the doctrine of contributory negligence in Aurora Branch
R.R. v. Grimes, 13 Ill. 585 (1852), abandoned it in Galena & Chicago Union
R.R. v. Jacobs, 20 Il1. 478 (1858) in favor of a common law form of compara-
tive negligence which compared degrees of negligence to established liability
(the "ordinary-gross" distinction) but did not apportion damages. However,
Illinois returned to the original doctrine in Calumet Iron & Steel Co. v. Martin,
115 Ill. 358, 3 N.E. 456 (1885) and had adhered to the doctrine until the present
case.
3. Maki v. Frelk, 85 Ill. App. 2d 439, 229 N.E.2d 284, 285 (1967).
[Vol. 20
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during the Industrial Revolution provided the impetus neces-
sary to entrench the doctrine firmly in negligence law.
4
The doctrine originated in England in 1809 in the case of
Butterfield v. Forrester,5 in which the plaintiff left a public
house at dusk and rode his horse "violently" into a pole project-
ing across part of the highway, thereby injuring himself. The
pole had been negligently placed across the road by the defend-
ant who was using it in house repairs. The court held that, "One
person being in fault will not dispense with another's using
ordinary care for himself."6 The reasoning of the case was
followed in England, and the doctrine was first adopted in the
United States in 189A.7 Contributory negligence was recognized
in Illinois in 1852,8 in South Carolina as early as 1851, 9 and
is today a part of the tort law in the majority of jurisdictions
in this country.
The logic of the doctrine is easy to see, but allowing the de-
fense as a complete bar to any recovery by the plaintiff clearly
could and did give harsh results. While the development of such
doctrines as "last clear chance"'1 tended to abrogate this harsh-
ness, the result was to completely swing the pendulum back to
the plaintiff allowing him full recovery. A more permanent
modification of the defense was the distinction between "casual"
or "ordinary" and "willful and wanton" negligence.': However,
the result of total recovery or total loss remained under this
distinction. Since there is often some degree of negligence on both
sides in an accident case, comparative negligence and apportion-
ment of damages has long been popular with most authorities on
the subject of torts. 2 Those favoring retention of the contribu-
tory negligence doctrine feel that the actual results are not as
4. See Mald v. Frelk, 85 Ill. App. 2d 439, 229 N.E.2d 284 (1967).; W.
PRossER, THE LAW oF TORTS § 64 at 428 (3d ed. 1964) ; Eldredge, Contributory
Negligence: An Outmoded Defense That Should Be Abolished, 43 A.B.A.J. 52
(1957).
5. 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (1809).
6. Id. at 927.
7. Smith v. Smith, 2 Pick. 621 (Mass. 1824).
8. Aurora Branch R.R. v. Grimes, 13 Ill. 585 (1852).
9. See, e.g., Freer v. Cameron, 4 Rich. L. 228 (S.C. 1851).
10. Davies v. Mann, 152 Eng. Rep. 588 (1842).
11. C. GREGoRY & H. KALvEN, CASES AND MATERMALS ON ToRTs, 226 (1959).
12. See, e.g., Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 Mica. L. REv. 465 (1953) ;
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severe as the majority would have us believe, and at least one
writer feels the doctrine is necessary as a check on the American
jury.1
8
The Maki court considered several of the "typical" arguments
in favor of retaining the doctrine. The arguments discussed were
that any harshness of contributory negligence would be over-
come by compromised jury verdicts,14 and that comparative
negligence would not encourage settlements; therefore, court
congestion and insurance rates would be increased.15 The court
viewed these arguments as based on administrative and pro-
cedural considerations insufficient to justify the substantive
wrongs which have often arisen under the contributory negli-
gence doctrine. The Workmen's Compensation Act16 and the
Federal Employee's Liability Act 17 were cited as examples of
local and national statutory abrogation of the old rule in the
"industrial" tort area. The court saw a modern day "transpor-
tation revolution" as requiring the same flexibility in all other
tort areas and proceeded to adopt the so-called "modified"
formula' 8 of comparative negligence and apportionment of
damages.
While several states have adopted comparative negligence
statutes, the possibility that such a step would ever be taken
by a court had been seriously questioned by most authorities.19
This fact was pressed on the court by defendant's argument that
such a decision was for the legislature, not the court. The logic
of the court's reasoning and the simplicity of its reply could
provide great persuasion on other jurisdictions if faced with
13. Powell, Contributory Negligence: A Necessary Check on the American
Jury, 43 A.B.A.J. 1005 (1957).
14. Id.
15. See Gilmore, Comparative Negligence From a Viewpoint of Casualty
Insurance, 10 ARx. L. REv. 82 (1955).
16. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 138-72 (1950), as amended (Supp. 1967);
see also S. C. CoDE ANN. §§ 72-1 to-504 (1962); as amended (Supp. 1967).
17. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1964).
18. The present statutes dealing with comparative negligence fall roughly into
two groups. The "pure" form permits the plaintiff to recover regardless of his
degree of negligence, while the "modified" form allows recovery only if the
plaintiff is less negligent than the defendant. In the former case a plaintiff who
is eighty percent negligent could still recover twenty percent of his damages,
while under the latter type statute, whenever his negligence reaches fifty per-
cent, he is barred from any recovery.
19. C. GamoRY & H. KALvEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS, 224 (1959);
see W. PRoSsER, THE LAW or TORTS § 66, at 445 (3d ed. 1964); Comment,
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a similar argument. The court replied: "The doctrine of con-
tributory negligence was created by the courts, not the legis-
lature. If we have created it, and if it does not meet the needs
of present day life, then we are duty bound to abolish it.1120
DoiqALD H. STUBBS
20. Mald v. Frelk, 85 IIL App. 2d 439, 229 N.E.2d 284, 291 (1967).
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TORTS - Municipal Corporations - The proprietary-govern-
mental test is discarded as the method of determining liability
for municipal corporations. B. W. King, Incorporated v. Town
of West New York (N.J. 1967).
The plaintiff brought an action for recovery of damages
to its properties resulting from a fire which originated on piers
owned by the defendant municipality. The piers were acquired
incident to the exercise of the municipality's taxing power. The
piers were not employed for a municipal purpose but were rented
for barge tie-ups at a nominal daily fee. The appellate division
reversed the trial court's judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict, and reinstated plaintiff's jury verdict. The Supreme Court
of New Jersey, held, reversed and remanded. Liability would
not be based upon a finding that the municipality's function in
connection with this property was either proprietary or govern-
mental. However, liability would be based on the premise that
a municipality acquiring title to realty incident to the exercise
of its taxing power, but not employing or using the acquired
property for a public municipal purpose, would have the same
duties and liabilities as would private land owners. B. W. King,
Incorporated v. Town of West New York, 49 N.J. 318, 230 A. 2d
133 (1967).
"The central idea in the law of municipal tort liability is
that a municipality is liable for its torts in the exercise of pro-
prietary but not governmental functions."' It is generally as-
sumed, as did the Supreme Court recently, that the distinction
"is an endeavor.., to escape from the basic historical doctrine
of sovereign immunity."2 Actually, "before the judicial inven-
tion of the distinction, liability was usually imposed upon mu-
nicipalities without regard to the distinction." The origin of
municipal immunity can be traced to an early English decision,
Russell v. Men of Devon,4 which was based on the theory that
"the king can do no wrong but his ministers may."5 There was
1. Davis, Tort Liability of Governmental Units, 40 MIN. L. REv. 751, 773
(1956).
2. Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 65 (1955).
3. Davis, Tort Liability of Governmental Units, 40 MiNN. L. Ray. 751, 773
(1956) ; e.g., Hooe v. Alexandria, 12 F. Cas. 461 (No. 6666) (C.C.D.C. 1802);
Goodloe v. Cincinnati, 4 Ohio 500 (1831); see Barnett, The Foundations of
the Distinction between Public and Private Functions in Respect to the
Common-Law Tort Liability of Municipal Corporations, 16 Om. L. Rnv. 250
(1937).
4. 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788).
5. Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130, 132 (Fla. 1957).
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an early Massachusetts decision" adopting this distinction but
the leading American case is Bailey v. City of New York.7 By
1939 all but two states had adopted the proprietary-governmen-
tal test for determining municipal corporate liability.8
Although at present this doctrine generally prevails, it "is
undergoing essential modification, and certain judicial decisions
and writers have faith in its abolition." 9 The Supreme Court
of Florida was the first court to overrule the precedent of
basing municipal liability on the proprietary-governmental dis-
tinction. The court stated "that the time has arrived to face this
matter squarely in the interest of justice and place the responsi-
bility for wrongs where it should be." 10 The court acknowledged
the doctrine of stare decisis; however, it felt that the law should
not be static but should meet the needs and demands of changing
times. The court said that since the modern city is substantially
a large business institution, it should not be endowed with
sovereign immunity. Other state supreme courts have also abol-
ished the distinction and based their decisions on the need to
place the responsibility for wrongs where it should be."
New Jersey has long experienced difficulty in applying this
inadequate method of determining municipal liability. By 1934,
it had reached a variety of results under the rule.12 Since then
the decisions "have not met the persistent demand for some
definitive statement setting principles which will uniformly
control in this area."' 3 The New Jersey Supreme Court in
Cloyes v. Townsbip of Delaware14 said that this test for de-
termining liability would not withstand inquiry. It went on to
say, however, that this was not the case "in which to consider
6. Mower v. Leicester, 9 Mass. 247 (1812).
7. 3 Hill 531 (N.Y. 1842).
8. Hooggard v. City of Richmond, 172 Va. 145, 200 S.E. 610 (1939). South
Carolina and Florida were the holdouts.
9. MCQUILLIA, MUmcnAL CoRPORATioN §53.24a, at 179 (3d ed. 1963).
10. Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130, 132 (Fla. 1957).
11. E.g., Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist, 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11
Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961) ; Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. Number 302,
18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959) ; Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231,
111 N.W2d 1 (1961); Irvine v. Town of Greenwood, 89 S.C. 511, 72 S.E. 228
(1911). The South Carolina court rejected the distinction but upheld sovereign
immunity for both functions.
12. See Tort Liability of Muricipalities in New Jersey, 3 MERcER BEAsLEY L.
REv. 142 (1934).
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whether to come to grips with the entire problem." 5 In the
case at hand the court did come to grips with the problem when
it was faced with a municipal function that could be classified
as either proprietary or governmental. It recognized the fact
that there had been a blind adherence to the proprietary-gov-
ernmental distinction without a real consideration of the reasons
underlying the doctrine. The court took cognizance of the gen-
eral expansion of municipal activity and agreed with what it
felt was a consensus that most of the reasons for immunity have
expired and that municipal liability should be subject to less
restrictive limits. The court therefore refused to apply the test
and held that the municipality should have the same duties
and liabilities as private landowners have in similar situations.
By discarding this test for determining municipal liability
in New Jersey, the court has raised the problem of developing
a substitute rule. As the court pointed out, it is most diffi-
cult if not impossible to visualize all the possible sets of circum-
stances which could give rise to a claimed municipal liability.
Other state supreme courts have shifted the burden of de-
veloping a new rule to their legislatures.'( The South Carolina
Supreme Court has said that there would be no municipal lia-
bility in the absence of action by the legislature.17 The Michigan
Supreme Court, on the other hand, has said that there would
be no municipal immunity in the absence of action by the legis-
lature.18
The New Jersey Supreme Court, however, stated that the
problem should be approached on a case by case basis, and a
new theory of liability should slowly transform. In approaching
each case the question asked should not be why immunity should
not apply in a given situation but rather one of asking whether
there is any reason why it should apply.
EDWvN B. BRAnIG
15. Id. at 332, 129 A.2d at S.
16. Irvine v. Town of Greenwood, 89 S.C. 511, 72 S.E. 228 (1911) ; Williams
v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 111 N.W2d 1 (1961).
17. 89 S.C. 511, 72 S.E. 228 (1911).
18. 364 Mich. 231, 111 N.W2d 1 (1961).
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